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1962/11/13

Unclassified

November 13, 1962

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THE PROBLEM OF "ASSURANCES"

1. In the original understanding between the President and Chairman Khrushchev, the President said he would lift the quarantine and give assurances against an invasion of Cuba only when both of two conditions had been met: The verified removal of offensive weapons, and the safeguarded promise not to reintroduce them.

2. The President decided on November 12th that we would lift the quarantine if the Soviets, in addition to getting the missiles out, also promised to get the IL-28 bombers out of Cuba within a reasonable period, such as thirty days.

3. This left the United States "assurances against an invasion of Cuba" as the primary lure with which to secure the "suitable safeguards to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems". *+ verification of removal* See 7a

4. The "suitable safeguards" will require performance on the part of both the Soviets and the Cubans.

(a.) From the Soviets we will want a firm and public *+ will pass Cuban - (b)* statement that they will refrain from introducing offensive weapons into the Hemisphere. This might be registered in a formal statement to the Security Council of the United Nations.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

(b) From the

REVIEWED by *Jhm*

DATE *3-2-88*

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- 2 -

From the Cubans we will want agreement to accept some form of on-the-spot inspection, to back up an undertaking on their part that they will refrain from bringing offensive weapons into Cuba.

*- must do the same in the
South, not to place
Cuba.*

5. The Cubans will presumably insist on some form of reciprocity or mutuality in any long-term inspection arrangements.

*But
long
it.*

(a) The best arrangement would seem to be a Latin American Denuclearized Zone with a UN presence attached to it, as outlined in the memorandum dated November 10, 1962, from the Secretary of State to the President. This would require the Cubans to accept no more rigorous inspection arrangements than would be accepted by all the other members of the Zone.

(b) If necessary, this could be made even more attractive to the Cubans by introducing some form of UN inspection to make sure that the countries of the Caribbean area (including the United States) are not preparing to invade each other. This would involve UN investigation of any reported Cuban refugee training establishments in Guatemala, Puerto Rico, Florida, or wherever.

No

*unusual -
US*

It would be

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- 3 -

It would be important, however, not to establish a "Caribbean security system" that would introduce a Russian veto or troika-type control commission into the Western Hemisphere, or cut across the inter-American security system established by the Rio Treaty.

6. The U.S. assurances would include:

- (a) An assurance against an invasion of Cuba;
- (b) An assurance that the United States would not support the invasion of Cuba by others operating from U.S. territory; and
- (c) An OAS resolution, which the United States would be willing to sponsor, giving parallel assurances on behalf of the nineteen other American republics.

The form and formality of these assurances would be a matter for negotiation. Soviet negotiators in New York are talking in terms of a formal protocol or even a treaty. But it is hard to see why we would need to go further than a declaration by the United States Representative in the UN Security Council.

The United States assurances would be explicitly contingent on:

- (a) The removal of offensive weapons systems from Cuba, verified by the UN;

(b) Undertakings

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- 4 -

meanings & making

(c) Undertakings by the Soviet Union and by Cuba that they would not re-introduce offensive weapons systems into Cuba; and

(c) Safeguards against such re-introduction, as per paragraph 5 above, or in some other satisfactory way.

8. The preceding paragraphs assume a minimum amount of cooperation from Castro. If Castro does not cooperate at all, then we could nevertheless say something like this:

Why in the world

"The United States does not intend to invade Cuba, and will not do so unless the Cubans (a) allow an offensive military base to be established in their country, or (b) mount aggressive actions against other nations of the Hemisphere."

This would amount to a non-invasion assurance which we would be giving to the Soviets, contingent upon satisfactory behavior by the Cubans.

even with Brazil Res. without a formal commitment

In any event, we should maintain in any ultimate arrangement the possibility of periodic air surveillance of Cuba, under the existing UN resolution of October 23rd (which recommends that "member States ... take all measures, individually and collectively including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot

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- 5 -

...to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military materiel and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent ...").

If Cuba is cooperating in some form of international safeguards against the reintroduction of offensive weapons, we will need our OAS surveillance to detect new suspicious activity in Cuba that should be looked at more closely by whatever international inspection is operating on the ground.

If Castro is not cooperating we will never have completed the verification of the original transaction, and continued air surveillance will be justified to make sure that the U.S.-Soviet agreement against the re-introduction of offensive weapons is being honored.

10. Under the arrangements described above, whether or not Castro cooperates in the short-term verification or long-term safeguards, Chairman Khrushchev will have come out of the transaction with three substantial accomplishments. He will have prevented nuclear war. He will have secured the lifting of the OAS quarantine. And he will have elicited from the President of the United States a pledge (albeit a contingent one) against an invasion

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- 6 -

an invasion of Cuba. We on one side will have gotten rid of the missiles and the bombers. We will still have a "Cuban problem", but without the dangerous by-product of nuclear confrontation with the Soviets.

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ALTERNATE COPY FOLLOWS

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TS
(314)
November 13, 1962

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2. The President decided on November 12th that we would lift the quarantine if the Soviets, in addition to getting the missiles out, also promised to get the IL-28 bombers out of Cuba within a reasonable period, such as thirty days.

3. This left the United States "assurances against an invasion of Cuba" as the primary lure with which to secure the "suitable safeguards to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems".

4. The "suitable safeguards" will require performance on the part of both the Soviets and the Cubans.

(a) From the Soviets we will want a firm and public undertaking that they will refrain from introducing offensive weapons into the Hemisphere. This might be registered in a formal statement to the Security Council of the United Nations.

(b) From the

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS, FPC/CDR

Date: 4/3/92

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PA Exemptions

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(b) From the Cubans we will want agreement to accept some form of on-the-spot inspection, to back up an undertaking on their part that they will refrain from bringing offensive weapons into Cuba.

5. The question of inspection in Cuba involves the short-term problem of on-site verification that all offensive weapons have been removed and the long-term problem of safeguards against the future introduction of such weapons. An additional aspect of the problem is whether some form of reciprocity or mutuality is acceptable to the United States and the USSR. A device devised with respect to both the short-term and long-term problems.

(a) The best long-term arrangement would seem to be a Latin American denuclearized zone with a UN presence attached to it, as proposed in the memorandum of November 10, 1962, from the Secretary of State to the President. This would require the Cubans to accept no more rigorous inspection arrangements than would be accepted by all the other members of the zone. However, even assuming Cuban cooperation, some months would be required for such an arrangement to be put into effect.

(b) For the short-term, pending the coming into effect of the denuclearized zone proposal, we must seek some arrangement that does not involve us with Castro's "five points". The Soviets have the primary responsibility for coming up with a satisfactory substitute for the UN verification envisaged in the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding. However, we would not object to some form of

verification

[REDACTED]

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verification which would also contain the element of assuring the Cubans against "invasion". A UN presence in Cuba in itself would implicitly carry with it this element. However, we would not object to UN terms of reference for such a presence explicitly setting forth the competence of the UN verification body to investigate within Cuba all violation of Cuban territorial integrity by armed bands from the outside. Additionally, we would not object to such a UN body being able to inspect alleged Cuban refugee training establishments on U.S. territory or elsewhere in the Caribbean conditioned upon Cuba accepting inspection of establishments within Cuba alleged to be preparing for ^{ad} ventures elsewhere.

[REDACTED]

It would be important, however, not to establish a "Caribbean security system" that would introduce a Russian veto or troika-type control commission into the Western Hemisphere, or cut across the inter-American security system established by the Rio Treaty.

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7. The United States assurances would be explicitly contingent on:

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(b) Undertakings

[REDACTED]

(b) Undertakings by the Soviet Union and by Cuba that they would not re-introduce offensive weapons systems into Cuba; and

(c) Safeguards against such re-introduction, as per paragraph 5 above, or in some other satisfactory way.

8. The preceding paragraphs assume a minimum amount of cooperation from Castro. If Castro does not cooperate at all, then we could nevertheless say something like this:

"The United States does not intend to invade Cuba, and will not do so unless any of the conditions stated in the President's press conference of September 13 should occur."

This would amount to a non-invasion assurance which we would be giving to the Soviets, contingent upon satisfactory behavior by the Cubans.

9. In any event, we should maintain in any ultimate arrangement the possibility of periodic air surveillance of Cuba, under the existing OAS resolution of October 23rd (which recommends that "member states ... take all measures, individually and collectively including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot

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continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military materiel and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent ...").

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IO:HCleveland:mtb

To [REDACTED]